Image SBOM advisories
When a pinned image’s digest is replaced, the Count compares the OS packages in the old and new digests’ SBOMs through OSV.dev. The user-facing behaviour is in container image rebuilds; this page covers how it is built.
OSV.dev stays the only vulnerability source. No image layer is ever read, and no package list is stored outside the HTTP cache.
Where it runs
Section titled “Where it runs”The engine’s image phase runs after digests are resolved and before the
report is assembled, for repositories with security.advisories and
security.images on. For every pinned Docker or OCI dependency it collects the
current digest and each new digest a proposal will pin (a same-tag digest
update, or a tag update’s newDigest), and reads one SBOM per digest and
platform in security.imagePlatforms (linux/amd64 by default), 16 at a
time. A dependency with a digest that has none of those platforms is then read
for the first platform that digest’s index lists, on all its digests. OSV
receives no image digest and no SBOM. For the SBOMs of replacements only, one
batched querybatch call carries each source package’s ecosystem (such as
Debian:12), name and version; full records are then read by advisory ID
(see Comparing).
The current digest is read even without a replacement, so the dashboard can list an image whose SBOM gives nothing to compare before its first rebuild.
Reading an SBOM
Section titled “Reading an SBOM”patchula_datasource::Client::image_sbom (crates/datasource/src/images.rs)
returns Found, Missing, NoPlatform (the index has no such platform; it
carries the first platform the index does list, skipping attestations) or
Gone (the registry answers 404 for the digest):
- GET the manifest by digest and check its SHA-256. An index is searched for
the platform’s manifest and for the attestation manifests whose
vnd.docker.reference.digestis that manifest, each in turn; a layer within-toto.io/predicate-type: https://spdx.dev/Documentis the SBOM. A single manifest has no platform list, so its config blob is read, checked against its digest and reduced to itsos,architectureandvariant; one that differs from the requested platform isNoPlatform. - Otherwise the cosign tags:
sha256-<digest>.attfor the platform digest, then the index digest, then.sbomfor both. A HEAD comes first, so a missing tag costs nothing against pull limits. The manifest a tag names is read by the digest inDocker-Content-Digest(from the HEAD, or else from the GET) and checked against it; a registry that sends neither has its tag skipped. An.attlayer must be an SPDX in-toto statement, optionally in a DSSE envelope, whose subject is the digest it was found for. - Each blob’s SHA-256 is checked against its digest.
A Docker official image (library/* on Docker Hub) is read from
mirror.gcr.io first, and from Docker Hub only when the mirror fails or
answers 404. Because every byte is checked against its digest, the mirror
can’t change what is read. Registry tokens, retries and rate limits go
through the same client as every other registry read.
SPDX 2.x is read on its own, in an in-toto statement or in a DSSE envelope
around one. The blob is reduced once, when fetched, by the sbom-os derived
representation of the HTTP cache: its digest, in-toto
subjects, generator (SPDX creationInfo.creators), the count of OS packages,
the package types and namespace, the distro, and the set of source packages to
query. File entries, which make up most of a Docker Scout SBOM, are never
stored.
Source packages
Section titled “Source packages”OSV’s Debian and Ubuntu records name source packages, and Alpine’s the origin.
The reducer takes, for each deb, apk or rpm package URL:
- nothing, when the package is the
spdxElementIdof aGENERATED_FROMrelationship, because its source is an entry of its own (Docker Scout); - the
upstreamqualifier,name@versionor justname(syft); - otherwise its own name and version.
The distro comes from os_name and os_version, or from distro=name-version.
The Debian source linux is dropped: OSV lists every kernel advisory against
it, and a container doesn’t run the image’s kernel.
Measured against osv-scanner’s full image scans, this finds the same OSV IDs on debian:bookworm, a 2025 bookworm digest, ubuntu:24.04, an older noble digest, alpine:3.20 and alpine:3.20.3, and on a syft SBOM of a Debian 13 image.
An SBOM is sources_known when it has a GENERATED_FROM relationship, an
upstream qualifier, or comes from Docker Scout. Otherwise it is
partial-sources, and its packages are queried under their own names.
Ecosystems
Section titled “Ecosystems”| Package type and namespace | OSV ecosystem |
|---|---|
deb/debian |
Debian:<major> |
deb/ubuntu |
Ubuntu:<year>.<month>, with :LTS for even-year April releases |
apk/alpine |
Alpine:v<major>.<minor> |
apk/wolfi, apk/chainguard |
Wolfi, Chainguard |
Anything else, an SBOM mixing package types, and every RPM distribution are
os-not-covered. OSV covers some RPM distributions, but their source RPM
names and versions haven’t been measured against it yet.
Comparing
Section titled “Comparing”patchula_lookup::images::compare works per platform present in both
digests, on the advisory IDs of OSV’s batch answer. An advisory is fixed when
OSV lists it for one of the old SBOM’s queries and for none of the new one’s. It
gets one row for each source package of the old SBOM that OSV lists it for,
each with the new image’s version of that package, or none when the package is
gone. Advisories
only the new image has are introduced. The result’s state is the worst of its
platforms, in this order: unreadable, previous-unavailable, no-sbom,
sbom-without-os, os-not-covered, partial-sources, checked,
no-os-packages. A digest pair with no platform in common is not checked.
An empty OS package list is trusted as “nothing to list” only from a generator
that catalogs whole images: Docker Scout, syft or apko. Any other generator’s
empty list is sbom-without-os.
A rebuild that fixes something gets the advisory IDs in fixes, the policy of
security.apply and security.label, through Evaluator::secure. secure
refuses, and the rebuild stays an ordinary update, when security.apply turns
off active or digest, or its permitted filter doesn’t match the new tag. The
advisories join metadata.advisories, so the dashboard’s known
vulnerabilities and the PR’s Change.advisories carry them; the comparison
itself is Update.image, and the current digest’s warning, if any, is
metadata.image. A warning for an image matched by security.quietImages
carries the reason in silenced; the PR leaves it out and the dashboard lists
it under “Silenced”.
If the OSV call fails, comparisons that would be checked or
partial-sources become unreadable, so a failure never reads as “nothing
fixed”.
Not built yet: an update held back by its release-age wait isn’t compared, so an image fix in it doesn’t skip the wait the way a package fix does; and there is no fallback to the distro’s signed package index for SBOMs that give no source packages.
The HTTP cache treats a registry manifest or blob addressed
by digest as fresh for ten years once it has been read successfully, and stores
it even when the registry says no-store or Vary (quay.io does), since the
bytes are public and checked against their digest. The exception does not cover
a read made with an account’s token or a private
registry entry’s credentials, whose bytes
may be private; those follow the registry’s no-store, and are cached under
their entry. A
404 for a digest or a .att/.sbom tag is kept for a day, never longer. A
cosign tag’s manifest is read by the digest its HEAD names, so only the
HEAD repeats.
The image queries go to OSV in their own batch after the digest phase, because
the new digests are known only then. Advisory records are read only for the
five most severe IDs a replacement fixes and the five most severe it brings in
(images::SHOWN), ranked by images::most_severe from the ID alone, since
the batch answer has no severity. The PR shows those in its table and lists
the rest as links “listed by OSV”. A rebuild is a security fix only when at
least one fixed record read isn’t withdrawn; when all of them are, the next
five in rank are read, until one holds or none are left. A withdrawn record
takes its ID out of the comparison.
Measured on five pinned images (debian:bookworm, ubuntu:24.04,
alpine:3.20 at older digests, node:22.11.0-bookworm-slim, and a quay.io
image whose old digest is gone), on the default linux/amd64, with
security.images on and off, a cold cache, then warm (the run predates
http.advisoryFreshnessSecs, which now answers the batch locally inside its
window):
| Requests, off | Requests, on | Time, off | Time, on | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cold | 76 | 165 | 2.6 s | 5.4 to 5.9 s |
| Warm | 12 | 16 | 0.2 s | 1.2 s |
The cold run’s extra 89 requests are the manifest, SBOM and cosign reads, with
SBOM blobs redirected from mirror.gcr.io (one Ubuntu SBOM is 2.4 MB, a Debian
one 4.8 MB), about 20 OSV records, at most ten per image update, and the OSV
batch; all but the batch are cached after that. Adding linux/arm64 costs 42
more cold requests and about a second (207 requests, 6.4 to 7.0 s) for the
same advisories on these images. Reading the record of every advisory the
rebuilds fix or bring in took 521 requests and 8.0 to 9.9 s. The warm run’s four
requests are the OSV batch, which takes most of its 0.8 s, and three HEADs for
quay.io cosign tags. The tests corpus has no pinned images the Count extracts,
so it costs the same with the check on or off.
crates/datasource/src/images.rsunit tests: syftupstreamand the kernel filter, Scout source entries, ecosystem names, DSSE subjects.crates/datasource/tests/registry_protocol.rs, simulated: an.attfor another subject is skipped for the.sbomtag, an SBOM blob whose bytes don’t match its digest is rejected, an SBOM attestation after a provenance one is found, a single manifest is matched to the platform in its config, a cosign manifest with no digest is not read, and an official image the mirror lacks is read from Docker Hub.crates/lookup/src/images.rsunit tests: fixed, removed and introduced advisories across platforms, an advisory listed for two packages, state precedence, and which current-digest states are warnings.crates/engine/tests/images.rsreplays recordings: twoalpine:3.20digests from mirror.gcr.io and OSV.dev, where the newer one fixes 29 advisories (fixtures/engine/sboms-alpine.json); and a Chainguard.att, a BuildKit SBOM without OS packages (busybox) and an image without an SBOM (fixtures/engine/sboms-registries.json).crates/engine/tests/advisories.rs: a rebuild whose image annotations claim a security fix, with no OSV match, gets no fixes and no label, while its twin with a match gets both undersecurity.apply.- PR and dashboard wording in
crates/update/src/pull_requests.rsandcrates/update/tests/dashboard.rs.
Registry bodies are checked against their digests, so the recorder keeps a body whose SHA-256 is a digest it was asked for (even after a redirect) byte for byte instead of reformatting it as JSON, and the redactor leaves a URL’s bytes alone unless it redacts something in it.
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